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In the 2001 bioterrorist attack in the United States, in which at least 22 cases of anthrax
occurred, there was initial uncertainty as to whether the index case was acquired from
natural sources, and many of the additional cases posed diagnostic challenges to
clinicians unfamiliar with the disease. The existence in Europe of terrorist groups with
demonstrated violent tendencies suggests Europe is not immune to bioterrorist attack,
and the same epidemiological and clinical confusion could happen here. Bacillus anthracis
is distributed widely in the soils of Europe and foci of animal disease occur, notably in
southern and eastern Europe. Sporadic human cases occur in these areas, and occasional
additional cases have been acquired from contaminated, imported materials or acquired
in countries outside of Europe, where anthrax may be common. Depending upon the
intent of a bioterrorist, illness-caused B. anthracis could take one of several clinical
forms—inhalational, cutaneous or gastrointestinal—and each would pose diagnostic
difficulties. Understanding the epidemiologic, pathophysiologic and bioterrorism prin-
ciples of anthrax are the clinician’s best means of early detection of cases.
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The recent bioterrorist attack in the USA has shar-
ply raised concerns about the possibility of bio-
terrorism attacks elsewhere, including Europe. It is
enticing to think that we in Europe are unlikely to
be a target for such acts. However, the existence of
multiple dissident groups in Europe, including
some with demonstrated violent tendencies [e.g.
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), or the Irish Repub-
lican Army (IRA)], the fact that Europe has experi-
enced deadly attacks on European targets by
groups without a distinct European origin (e.g.
the Red Army Faction and the 1968 Olympic
Games attack) and the previous use of bioterror-
ism by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, indicate other-
wise.
Although many microbiological agents could be
used by a bioterrorist, it is convenient for the
purposes of threat assessment to group them by
feasibility of use and potential public-health
impact. Grouping criteria may include ease of
weaponization, ease of transmission, person-to-
person communicability, potential mortality,
potential impact on the healthcare delivery sys-
tem, potential to produce public panic and social
disruption, and special preparations needed to
mount an effective public-health response. Based
on these criteria, Bacillus anthracis is believed to be
the single greatest biological threat, with the pos-
sible exception of smallpox virus [1].
In this paper, we review the epidemiology of
anthrax in Europe, reasons why B. anthracis has
been chosen as a bioterrorism weapon, and the
early clinical presentation of naturally occurring or
bioterrorism-caused cases. Recent, in-depth
papers have been written about bioterrorism,
and the clinical characteristics and management
of anthrax; we make no attempt to duplicate these
papers [1–9].
B A C I L L U S A N T H R A C I S
The microbiology of Bacillus anthracis
B. anthracis exists in two forms, the vegetative
form and the spore. The vegetative form is a
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facultatively anaerobic, large, Gram-positive bacil-
lus, which, under adverse growth conditions,
forms a single subterminal endospore. The endo-
spores are formed only in the presence of oxygen
and will not be seen in clinical specimens, such as
blood smears. The vegetative form grows readily
on many agars and is easy to isolate and maintain.
The use of a biological safety hood is recom-
mended during research. Most laboratory-
acquired infections are cutaneous, but inhalational
anthrax has occurred [10].
Under adverse environmental conditions, e.g.
release into soil from a dead or dying animal, the
vegetative bacilli die but endospores survive. The
spores are remarkably resistant to a range of
adverse environmental conditions, e.g. tempera-
ture, desiccation, pH, chemicals, or irradiation,
thus ensuring long-term survival [11]. These fea-
tures also make disinfection difficult, a problem
currently faced by the US government in its
attempts to cleanse contaminated office buildings
(by pumping of chlorine dioxide gas into sealed-
off, contaminated areas as well as surface decon-
tamination with liquid chlorine dioxide) and
ensure safety of the mail (by electron-beam irra-
diation).
The principal virulence factors of B. anthracis are
its capsule and two exotoxins, all of which are
coded on one of two plasmids, the pX01 and pX02
plasmids. The capsule inhibits phagocytosis of
vegetative cells. The two exotoxins are of the AB
type and utilize the same binding protein, protec-
tive antigen, in gaining entry into host cells. Edema
toxin produces tissue edema, inhibits neutrophil
activity, and interferes with production of tumor
necrosis factor and interleukin-6 by monocytes.
Lethal toxin interferes with intracellular signaling
by inactivating mitogen-activated protein kinase.
Lethal toxin also stimulates the release of tumor
necrosis factor and interleukin-1 from macro-
phages, which may contribute to death in anthrax
toxemia. Other lesser virulence factors are sus-
pected but not documented.
What is the reservoir of B. anthracis?
Anthrax is a zoonosis whose natural reservoir may
be considered to be the soil. There is no animal
reservoir, because infected animals rapidly die.
Anthrax is a disease largely of herbivorous ani-
mals which acquire their infection while grazing.
Secondary spread may occur directly to scavenger
animals, via flies contaminating vegetation, or via
biting flies in the case of highly susceptible animal
species. Anthrax is largely restricted to mammals,
although some cases may occur in bird species.
Domesticated animals, e.g. livestock, are most
important in human anthrax ecology, either
because of close contact between humans and
infected animals or carcasses, or because of con-
taminated products from animals.
Consideration of how B. anthracis survives in
soil has led to two schools of thought about
whether or not the bacillus grows outside of ani-
mal hosts. The ‘persistent spore theorists’ feel that
the bacillus can grow only after entering an animal
host; thus, B. anthracis survives solely as a spore
between periods within infected animals. The sec-
ond theory is that the bacillus will grow in soil
under certain conditions, which give it a compe-
titive edge over other soil microorganisms, periods
following either drought or heavy rainfall, often
with flooding. Evidence for this theory is based on
epidemiologic studies of animal epizootics, where
unusual climactic changes often precede an epi-
zootic.
How long spores survive in soil or other envir-
onments is unknown, and there is undoubtedly an
attrition rate over time. Some experts believe that
spores in the soil decline to clinically insignificant
numbers after 3 years [12]. That outbreaks of dis-
ease in animals may occur decades after the last
known previous cases in the geographic area indi-
cate either that this is not always the case or that
low-level replication is continuing prior to reach-
ing infective levels.
How do animals become infected?
Animals become infected after ingestion of the
vegetative form or spores. If spores are ingested,
disease begins in the intestinal tract, with subse-
quent development of septicemia. In the case of
scavenger animals who eat dead animals, the dis-
ease results from infection by vegetative organ-
isms, and the initial lesions are typically in the
pharynx; cervical adenopathy is often prominent.
Outbreaks in animals occur most frequently in
warm-weather months [13]. It is conjecture whe-
ther this is because extremely favorable climactic
changes bring forth large numbers of vegetative
forms, or because unfavorable climactic changes
bring animals into contact with spores; for exam-
ple, animals move to new grazing locations or
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change eating habits, such as eating closer to the
ground if there is sparse vegetation. Illness in
animals progresses rapidly, and often the first sign
of anthrax is the discovery of dead animals.
How is human anthrax acquired?
Anthrax in humans is acquired via food, air or skin
contact (Table 1). Human-to-human transmission
is very rare and is associated with poor hygiene in
persons caring for cases of cutaneous anthrax.
Autopsies carry a risk of cutaneous anthrax for
the pathologist, similar to that for veterinarians
conducting necropsies on dead animals. The vege-
tative form is important as a source of infection for
humans only when there is direct contact with
infected animals or, potentially, laboratory media.
Thus, spores represent the major mode of infection
in industrial societies, and vegetative forms in
agricultural societies.
A N T H R A X I N E U R O P E
Is anthrax found in Europe?
B. anthracis is distributed throughout the world.
Molecular typing of strains has now revealed that
many genotypes exist, and these are often geogra-
phically restricted. Whether B. anthracis arose
naturally on different continents or was imported
into some from indigenous sites is unknown. Some
authorities have postulated that international
trade in bone meal in earlier generations may have
introduced the organism into certain areas. For
instance, it is thought that B. anthracis was not
present in Australia until 1847, when it was
imported from India in bone meal, which then
contaminated Australian soils when used as a
fertilizer [14]. This hypothesis, while offering a
convenient way of explaining certain distribution
patterns, remains unproven.
In Europe, B. anthracis has existed for centuries.
The attention given to anthrax by European scien-
tists in the 19th century attests to its importance in
Europe as a widespread cause of disease in live-
stock and humans. Human cases occurred fre-
quently, not only in persons in contact with ill
and dead animals, but also among workers in
industries processing products contaminated by
anthrax spores, e.g. textiles containing animal
fibers. In the 17th century, the ‘black bane’ epi-
demic of anthrax occurred in Europe, taking a
large toll of animal and human lives, and later,
the term ‘malignant pustule’ of cutaneous anthrax
was used [15]. In 1876, Robert Koch, in Germany,
confirmed that B. anthracis was the cause of
anthrax, and, as a result of this work, ‘Koch’s
Postulates’ came into existence [15]. Because of
serious problems concerning livestock, several
prominent European microbiologists attempted
to develop a vaccine for animals in the 19th cen-
tury. Louis Pasteur in France tested an attenuated
spore vaccine in 1881 [15], and anthrax became the
first bacterial disease for which a vaccine was
available.
Following the development of Pasteur’s vaccine,
vaccination of animals was initiated, and the num-
bers of animal and human cases declined. Early
efforts to attenuate B. anthracis by various means,
such as growth at elevated incubation tempera-
tures to prepare vaccine, were not satisfactory. As
a result, some batches of the Pasteur-type vaccines
routinely contained varying percentages of live,
virulent organisms, occasionally leading to the
occurrence of anthrax in immunized animals
(and causing, in the Soviet Union, some makers
of anthrax vaccine to be executed) [16]. It was not
until 1939, when an attenuated unencapsulated
strain of B. anthracis was developed into a vaccine
by Max Sterne, in South Africa, that widespread,
safe vaccination of animals became available. The
widespread use of this and similar vaccines has
subsequently been the basis of anthrax control
measures in animals and indirectly, in humans.
Table 1 Sources of human infectiona
Illness/Source
Gastrointestinal anthrax
Eating dying or dead animals
Bioterrorism
Inhalational anthrax
Industries processing products of contaminated animals,




Handling dying or dead animals
Industries processing products of contaminated animals,
e.g. goat hair, hides
Souvenirs/clothing made of contaminated animal pro-
ducts
Contaminated drugs, used for injection
Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism is a potential mode of transmission for all
forms, depending upon the vehicle that the terrorist used.
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Does anthrax occur in livestock today in Europe?
Over time, in many European countries, the pre-
vention of new cases in animals as a result of
vaccination efforts—which continue today in
endemic areas—prevented the replenishment of
spores in soil. Existing spores or bacilli in the soil
became non-viable over time, and concentrations
either declined to levels so insignificant that they
were unlikely to cause disease or died off entirely.
Nevertheless, B. anthracis remains in the soil in
some countries in Europe and continues to cause
disease in animals and, occasionally, humans.
In the middle and higher latitudes of Europe,
anthrax in animals is now either absent or found
only in very sporadic cases, while it remains rela-
tively common in countries adjoining the Medi-
terranean Sea, particularly Turkey (with most
cases in the Asian part), Greece, the Balkan coun-
tries, Italy, and Spain [11,12,17] (Figure 1). Anthrax
is endemic in the Russian Federation, particularly
in the territory of the northern Caucasus, but most
cases in the former Soviet Union occur in Kazakh-
stan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and
Aserdaijan [18]. Sweden and, probably, Austria,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland and Lux-
embourg have eliminated anthrax [12]. In the
countries in which anthrax is considered common,
there may currently be several to 20 outbreaks
annually, each with several to dozens of animals
affected [17].
Is anthrax contracted in Europe by humans
today?
There is no surveillance system for human cases in
Europe, although efforts to form a system for
surveillance of infectious diseases, particularly
those associated with bioterrorism, are rapidly
being organized [19,20]. In addition, the diagnosis
of cases is undoubtedly haphazard and reporting
is incomplete. Sporadic cases occur in countries
where disease in livestock occurs and, occasion-
ally, outbreaks among humans occur (Figure 1).
Spain has the largest number of cases reported, 78–
152 cases annually between 1991 and 1995 (the last
5-year period for which comparable figures are
available), largely in central Spain [17]. In most
countries, however, cases are rare; for example,
France had no cases between 1972 and 1994 until a
case acquired in Africa occurred [21]. Russia had
sporadic outbreaks in the latter 1990s of gastro-
intestinal anthrax associated with eating animals
killed by anthrax [12].
Cases of anthrax have been, however, con-
tracted within Europe from infected, imported
products [22,23] (Figure 1). One outbreak in Swit-
zerland, reported a decade ago, although occur-
ring a decade before that, involved 25 workers in a
textile plant working with imported goat hair from
Pakistan [24]. The disease has also been contracted
outside of Europe in travelers, as in a fatal case
acquired in Senegal/Gambia, but diagnosed in
France [21].
These cases in Europe have consistently been
diagnostic puzzles for physicians. The recent dif-
ficulties experienced by US physicians in diagnos-
ing the initial cases of anthrax occurring after the
bioterrorist attack mirror the difficulties of Eur-
opean physicians. These diagnostic dilemmas
underscore the importance of: (1) understanding
the clinical characteristics of anthrax; (2) under-
standing how anthrax is contracted and where it
Figure 1 Distribution of animal and human cases in
Europe. The number of known or suspected animal cases
of anthrax can be used to categorize the anthrax situation
in countries. Countries in which more than 25 human cases
were reported between 1991 and 1995 are shown (four-
pointed star), as are locations where cases reported in the
medical literature and acquired abroad or from imported
products were diagnosed, 1991–2000 (five-pointed star).
Adapted from Hugh-Jones [17], Paulet et al. [21], Ringertz
et al. [22], and Mallon and McKee [23].
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occurs; and (3) obtaining exposure and travel
histories from patients with illnesses comparble
to anthrax.
Where outside of Europe does anthrax occur?
There is no surveillance system for animal or
human cases, and the distribution and magnitude
of cases are only generally known. In areas with
many cases, poor veterinary resources prohibit
vaccination of livestock, and outbreaks of disease
in livestock and humans occur. Thus, the devel-
oping world is where anthrax largely occurs. West
Africa is the most affected area of the world; there
is a traditional ‘anthrax belt’ that stretches from the
Middle East into Central Asia; Central America is
heavily affected; and scattered endemic areas exist
throughout much of Asia. Sometimes outbreaks
can be large, such as the outbreak in Zimbabwe in
1978–80, where almost 10 000 people were infected
and >100 died [25].
Gastrointestinal anthrax is acquired from eating
meat from dying or dead infected animals. Human
illness associated with such exposure often results
in a cutaneous lesion involving the tongue or
oropharynx, with cervical adenopathy. Cases of
this nature typically occur in countries with poor
food hygiene practices. In the European Union,
food regulations prohibit the processing for
human consumption of meat from such animals.
Persons ingesting spores as the result of eating
food made from dried meat from infected animals
may also develop lesions in the intestinal tract.
Inhalation anthrax results from the inhalation of
respirable anthrax spores. Outside of bioterrorism,
inhalation anthrax is largely limited to industrial
settings in which animal products contaminated
with spores, primarily goat hair, are processed.
That these products may represent a source of
inhalation (and cutaneous) anthrax was recog-
nized over 125 years ago, when the term ‘wool-
sorters’ disease’ was well established in Europe
[26]. Today, products that may be contaminated
come from the developing world, and include
hides and animal fibers, particularly goat hair,
mohair and, rarely, wool. These products are
thought to be contaminated because they are
removed from dead, infected animals. During
processing, aerosolization of spores occurs, lead-
ing to inhalation anthrax. Anthrax was prevented
in goat hair-processing workers through the use of
vaccine in the USA, and disinfection of goat hair by
formaldehyde in England. Today, synthetic fibers
have mainly replaced goat hair, making the pro-
blem largely one of historical interest.
Cutaneous anthrax occurs after skin contact
with bacilli from ill or dead animals, or spores.
Most cases of anthrax that occur in processing
plants are cutaneous, such as those that occurred
in the Swiss outbreak, when 24 of 25 cases were
cutaneous [24]. Occasional cases have occurred in
travelers who have acquired clothing or souvenirs
made with contaminated products, such as a
recent case in the UK, contracted after contact with
untreated leather [23]. Also, exposure to unusual
sources may occur, e.g. cutaneous anthrax and
fatal sepsis in a Norwegian individual following
injection-drug use, probably involving infected
heroin from Afghanistan, Pakistan or Iran (coun-
tries within ‘the anthrax belt’), where most of the
heroin used in Europe comes from [22].
A N T H R A X A S A B I O L O G I C A L
W E A P O N
History of anthrax as a biological weapon
Biowarfare
The attractiveness of anthrax as a bioweapon
was recognized by scientists very early. In 1915,
attempts were purportedly made by German
secret agents to infect horses, mules and cattle
being sent from the USA to the Western European
allies. In 1937, Japan used B. anthracis as a bio-
warfare weapon against Chinese civilians in
Manchuria. Other countries, specifically the
USA, the UK, and the Soviet Union, also started
developing B. anthracis as a weapon before or
during World War II, but ultimately did not utilize
biological weapons. After World War II, these
three countries continued offensive biological war-
fare programs for varying periods. The Soviet
Union was the last to officially end its program
in the 1990s, a little more than a decade after the
accidental release of B. anthracis at Sverdlousk led
to a number of human inhalation anthrax cases
[27]. More recently, Iraq has been implicated as
having an active biological warfare program, uti-
lizing a number of agents, including B. anthracis
[28].
Bioterrorism
Several bioterrorist attacks have been recognized,
and B. anthracis was used as the agent in the two
most prominent.
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Japan 1990–95
Members of Aum Shinrikyo, a well financed and
intellectual Japanese religious cult founded in the
1980s and still active, believe that nuclear war
between the USA and Japan is inevitable and that
a superhuman race will arise from the ashes.
Because such a war did not occur as rapidly as
the founder, Shoko Asahara, predicted, the cult
attempted to trigger the nuclear holocaust by a
series of biological and chemical attacks in Japan
between 1990 and 1995, using botulinum neuro-
toxin, gases (sarin and cyanide), and aerosolized B.
anthracis. In the best investigated incident using B.
anthracis, over a 4-day period the cult released
aerosolized B. anthracis from a spray device located
on the top floor of an eight-story building; no
documented cases resulted (Figure 2). The failure
of the attack to cause disease may rest mostly with
the strain of B. anthracis used, a strain with an
MLVA genotype identical to that of the avirulent
Sterne vaccine strain used to immunize animals
[29]. The cult reportedly obtained this strain from
commercial sources. Other, technical, reasons
probably also contributed to the failure, including
a low concentration of spores in the liquid med-
ium, clogging and low dispersal efficiency of the
spray device, and release primarily during day-
time, when solar radiation, even on cloudy days,
will kill spores (there was an estimated survival
time of the aerosolized spores of 30 min) [30].
USA 2001
A far more technically advanced and effective
attack occurred in September 2001 in the eastern
USA, causing 22 known cases, including five
deaths, in a multistate area. An unknown number
of envelopes, those identified containing a letter
and highly weaponized anthrax spores, were sent
to news agencies in New York or congressional
offices in Washington through the postal system
(Figure 2). The victims, who developed either
cutaneous or inhalation anthrax, became infected
from either handling the letters or being exposed
to aerosols from them. The exposures, in some
cases, seem to have been highly unlikely to cause
disease; for example, a letter next to a contami-
nated letter in the automated mail sorting system
of the US postal system becomes contaminated
also, and causes the recipient to acquire a fatal
case of inhalation anthrax. Many questions about
this attack remain unanswered, but the lack of
familiarity with anthrax among clinicians and
the quality of the agent used are not among
them.
The index case, an individual with cutaneous
anthrax, initially saw more than half a dozen
doctors and visited two emergency rooms without
receiving a diagnosis. The B. anthracis strain used
was the virulent Ames strain. The weaponizing
(the process of converting spores into the product
that the bioterrorist uses for dispersal, which
includes producing the optimal particle size and
additional technical aspects) was equal to what the
US military biowarfare program could acheive.
Figure 2 Methods of delivery of anthrax spores. (A) The
eight-storey building from which Aum Shinrikyo sprayed
a wet solution of anthrax spores. The spray device was
placed on the roof (inset) [30]. (B) The envelopes contain-
ing weaponized, dry anthrax spores sent to newsman Tom
Brokaw and Senator Tom Daschle, along with an enclosed
letter (United States Department of Justice).
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These virulence and dispersal qualities caused
some people exposed to even minute quantities
of spores to become ill. Thousands of additional
people who may have been exposed were placed
on antimicrobial prophylaxis; how many of these
might have been infected but had the development
of disease not been prevented is conjecture.
Why is B. anthracis a favorite choice for
biowarfare?
B. anthracis has many biological, technical and
virulence characteristics that make it attractive
as a bioweapon. Until recently, the agent was
relatively easily obtained from a variety of sources,
but regulatory prescriptions have now closed off
many of these sources. Anthrax, however, is ende-
mic in many countries which are known or sus-
pected to have active biological warfare programs,
such as Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, to name a few.
The bacillus may also be stolen from research
laboratories and obtained by other covert means.
Once obtained, it is relatively easy to grow and
process, albeit with some risk to the perpetrator. B.
anthracis can be dispersed as an aerosol from a wet
suspension or processed into a dry powder. The
dry form is much more hazardous. The knowledge
of how to process and disperse the organism can
be obtained from various legitimate as well as
covert sources. To produce the dry form in a truly
weaponized state requires considerable technical
expertise, but the feasibility of this activity was
demonstrated by the recent events in the USA.
Once produced, the weaponized agent can be
easily stored.
When used as a weapon of mass destruction,
either the wet or dry form of the agent is dispersed
in particles less than 5 mm in diameter, a size that
allows penetration into the pulmonary alveoli. The
number of spores (average spore size roughly 0.8
by 1.2 mm) per particle varies in proportion to the
particle diameter and the purity of preparation.
Inhaled and retained doses are typically expressed
as colony-forming units (CFU), although some
misinterpret this information as numbers of
spores. Estimates of the inhaled and retained infec-
tious dose50 (ID50) vary widely, from as few as
2500 CFU to 50 000 CFU, with 8000–10 000 CFU
being a common estimate. The ID50 and lethal
dose50 (LD50) are probably similar in untreated
patients, due to the high lethality of inhalation
anthrax (99% in the absence of treatment).
Although the estimated ID50 by the inhalation
route [1] may seem high when compared to other
organisns with a potential for biological warfare,
e.g. 10 organisms for Francisella tularensis (tulare-
mia), this difference in dose is offset by the stability
of the spores after release into the atmosphere, and
is readily overcome by good weaponization. Thus,
the ‘disadvantage’ of a relatively high ID50 is offset
by a relatively low LD50, due to the clinical viru-
lence of infection contracted by inhalation.
The combination of a highly stable agent and a
high case–fatality rate could lead to very large
numbers of casualties following an attack. For
example, we have previously estimated that a
capable bioterrorist, attacking by aerosol a city
of 100 000, would cause 50 000 cases of inhalation
anthrax and 32 875 deaths, at an economic cost of
$26.2 billion [9]. An efficient attack on a major city
might be accomplished with 50–100 kg of agent
[31,32].
C L I N I C A L C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S O F
E A R L Y A N T H R A X
Cutaneous anthrax
Textbooks note that ‘The clinical presentation of
cutaneous anthrax is so characteristic that the
diagnosis is not often missed by physicians famil-
iar with the disease’ [15]. The problem, of course, is
that only rarely are physicians familiar with the
disease. As the recent US experience and case
reports from Europe invariably demonstrate, diag-
nosis is missed for extended periods of time.
Numerous other diseases associated with ulcera-
tive skin lesions, including staphylococcal celluli-
tis, orf, plague, tularemia and spider bites, can be
confused with anthrax.
The usual incubation period is 2–6 days (range,
9 h to 12 days), although in many cases continuous
exposure (such as occurs in an industrial setting)
makes determination of an incubation period dif-
ficult [33]. Most symptoms occur on sites of com-
mon exposure, the arms or hands, followed in
frequency by the face or neck. The infection begins
as a pruritic papule. In a day or two, the papule
enlarges and forms an ulcer, often with surround-
ing vesicles (Figure 3). The initial ulcer is generally
1–3 cm in diameter and may expand, while a
characteristic black, central crust develops. There
is edema of the ulcer and surrounding skin. A
small percentage of patients develop malignant
edema, a clinical variant resembling cellulitis.
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Over 1–2 weeks, the lesion dries, the crust sepa-
rates, and slow healing occurs. The edema can be
quite pronounced, far exceeding the size of the
eschar. Regional lymphadenopathy, typically
painful, commonly occurs, as well as low-grade
fever and malaise. The skin lesion itself is usually
remarkably painless. In the pre-antibiotic era,
about 20% of cases of cutaneous anthrax died,
due to massive edema of the neck resulting in
airway obstruction, or due to septicemia. Lesions
on the head and neck are associated with the
greatest risk of mortality. With treatment, mortal-
ity should be <1%.
Inhalation anthrax
The incubation period is uncertain, but estimates
are generally in the range of 1–6 days for high-dose
exposures, with an incubation period of 43 days
reported in one patient with a presumably low-
dose exposure [27]. In experimental inhalation
anthrax, one monkey first developed clinical signs
98 days after exposure [34]. In the recent US experi-
ence, the median incubation period was 4 days
(range, 4–6 days) [7]. Inhalation anthrax is a bipha-
sic illness, beginning as a non-specific, mild, lower
respiratory tract infection. Symptoms of low-grade
fever, malaise and non-productive cough are fea-
tures. In the recent US experience of 10 patients,
patients waited a median of 3.5 days after symp-
toms began before seeking care; importantly, all 10
had an initially abnormal chest X-ray. Early X-ray
features include mediastinal widening, small infil-
trates, or pleural effusion due to lymphatic stasis.
Pulmonary infiltrates, however, do not represent a
common feature of early inhalation anthrax. This is
because the pathologic process is not a bronchop-
neumonia but, rather, a hemorrhagic mediastini-
tis, as bacilli are carried from the deposition sites in
the alveoli into the mediastinal lymph nodes,
causing the classic mediastinal widening seen on
chest X-ray. The lymphadenopathy is best demon-
strated by non-contrast spiral CT imaging (non-
anthrax patients may have apparent mediastinal
widening on chest X-ray, but lack the characteristic
mediastinal and carinal lymphadenopathy). One
of the 10 US patients was an exception, presenting
the appearance of a primary pneumonia (without
mediastinal lymphadenopathy).
After an initial 1–4 day-phase of non-specific
symptoms, inhalation anthrax progresses into a
second, fulminant phase (the ‘acute phase’), char-
acterized by high fever, diaphoresis, septicemia,
and respiratory distress. Typically, the chest X-ray
at this time shows clear mediastinal widening, due
to swollen mediastinal lymph nodes teeming with
B. anthracis (Figure 4). Patients may have signs and
symptoms of disease elsewhere, e.g. the gastroin-
testinal tract, or meningitis, due to widespread
bacteremia and septicemia. If the patient is left
untreated, death rapidly occurs, but, even with
treatment, mortality is high.
Figure 3 Pictures of cutaneous an-
thrax. (A) Ulcer with eschar and
modest edema. (B) Ulcer, surround-
ing vesicles, eschar and edema of
the lower leg. Neither case is char-
acteristic of malignant edema, which
is much more extensive.
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Gastrointestinal anthrax
Two forms of disease occur, oropharyngeal and
abdominal. Oropharyngeal anthrax occurs if
spores or bacilli impinge on the pharynx. There
may be a mucosal lesion resembling cutaneous
anthrax, and patients have sore throat, lymphade-
nopathy, fever and swelling of the neck; death
often occurs. Abdominal anthrax occurs if organ-
isms get into the digestive tract. Initial non-specific
symptoms of nausea, vomiting and fever change
over several days into bloody diarrhea, fever and
toxemia as disease progresses. Death after 2–
5 days is common (60–75%) in untreated patients.
Death rates can be significantly reduced with
early therapy, particularly with the oropharyngeal
form.
T H E L A B O R A T O R Y F E A T U R E S O F
A N T H R A X
Laboratory results of the usual tests are non-
specific and not significantly useful in diagnosis.
In inhalation anthrax, Gram stain of sputum is not
likely to be helpful in the initial and early acute
phases, because the pulmonary process is not
initially a bronchoalveolar pneumonia. Blood cul-
tures are typically positive in the acute phase of
inhalation anthrax, and bacteria may be demon-
strable in peripheral smears, due to the high-
titered bacteremia typical of septicemic anthrax.
Cultures of potentially infected sites, e.g. cuta-
neous anthrax, should be done, but negative cul-
tures do not exclude the diagnosis, particularly if
treatment occurred prior to culture. Most cuta-
neous and septicemic anthrax patients (>80%) will
have negative cultures after 24 h of therapy. The
laboratory should be notified that anthrax is sus-
pected, because species identification of Bacillus
spp., even when isolated from blood cultures, is
not necessarily performed routinely [5].
While culture provides the best means of spe-
cific diagnosis, diagnosis can be made by PCR of
infected material, immunostaining of biopsy mate-
rial, or serology. These, however, are not readily
available in Europe, and complete laboratory facil-
ities in the USA, where preparations for bioterror-
ism have been underway for several years, are
available only at the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (Atlanta, GA).
T H E R A P Y
Prompt institution of antimicrobial therapy plays
an important role in the successful management of
cases. With cutaneous anthrax, mortality should
be rare if therapy is instituted before signs of
systemic toxicity are present. For inhalation
anthrax, mortality in the US bioterrorist attack
was 40%, considerably less than mortality rates
of >85% in other series of treated inhalation
anthrax [7]. This may be because all patients
received at least two antibiotics active against B.
anthracis, excellent hospital support was given, or
therapy was instituted early [7]. Previous work in
primates exposed to aerosolized B. anthracis indi-
cates that rate of increased survival is improved by
early administration of antimicrobials.
An important concept is that anthrax is a toxin-
mediated disease. Antimicrobial therapy will
result in rapid bacteriologic cure, but the toxin
will result in progression of the lesions for 24–
48 h. In one study of cutaneous anthrax, bacterio-
logic cure was typical within 24 h, but clinical
response was not apparent until 72 h after initia-
tion of therapy.
The approach to therapy is guided, in part, by
whether the disease is naturally occurring or
related to a bioterrorist attack. Recommendations
for the latter are influenced by the likelihood of
aerosol exposure; that is, a case of cutaneous
anthrax cannot be assumed not to have been
exposed to an aerosol, and there may have been
genetic manipulation of B. anthracis into a form
resistant to antimicrobials. We refer the reader to
other sources for detailed guidance [6].
Figure 4 Chest X-ray of an individual with the acute phase
of anthrax, showing mediastinal widening, pulmonary
infiltrates/fluid and pulmonary edema.
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